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Since the eruption of the global financial crisis in 2008, macroprudential regulation has 
become a mantra in the regulatory world. The soon-to-be-widespread adoption of macro 
prudential tools will inevitably affect the dynamics of the economy and consequently 
have  a  direct  bearing  on  the  conduct  of  monetary  policy.  This  paper  explores 
theoretically  several  issues  surrounding  the  interplay  between  macroprudential 
regulation  and  monetary  policy.  Among  the  key  issues  examined  are  the  economic 
stabilization  role  of  rule-based  macroprudential  policy,  the  implications  of  a 
countercyclical capital requirement on the monetary transmission mechanism, and the 
optimal policy combination. 
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 1 Introduction
The recent global nancial crisis has brought to prominence the macroprudential approach
to nancial regulation. Although the idea that the traditional \microprudential" ap-
proach of ensuring safety and soundness of individual nancial institutions is not adequate
to safeguard the nancial system as a whole and therefore needs to be complemented by
the macroprudential approach that takes a system-wide perspective dates back to the
late 1970s at the BIS meetings. (Clement (2010)), it only came to the limelight after the
near collapse of nancial systems in many developed countries in the fall of 2008. Since
then, macroprudential regulation has found strong acceptance across jurisdictions, with
the latest BCBS announcement (2010) on the new global minimum capital standards
(Basel III) adding further to its legitimacy.
The soon-to-be-widespread adoption of macroprudential tools by the regulatory
authorities inevitably aects the dynamics of the nancial system and the economy and
hence has a direct bearing on the conduct of monetary policymakers, the traditional
guardians of economic stability. However, despite the substantial progress on the imple-
mentation of macroprudential policy, little is known about its interplay with monetary
policy. Among the key policy questions that come up time and again in international
policy forums are the tradeo, the complementarities and the substitutability between
the two policies, and the appropriate policy combinations.
The goal of this paper is to explore some of the key issues surrounding the coor-
dination between monetary policy and certain forms of macroprudential measures from
a theoretical perspective. To accomplish this goal, we rely on two distinct, yet related,
models. The rst one is a standard hybrid new Keynesian macro model modied to
incorporate a simple banking sector. We use this model to study the implications of
a countercyclical buer add-on (BCBS (2010)) on optimal monetary policy and optimal
policy combination. Our second model is less conventional, but has rich nancial stability
dimension which is absent in the rst model. With the latter, we are able to study in
detail the genesis of nancial instability and the mechanism through which monetary
policy and macroprudential regulation can be combined to address it.
The rest or the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 analyses the interplay be-
tween countercyclical capital requirement and monetary policy in a context of a standard
macroeconomic model commonly used for monetary policy analysis. Among the issues
examined with this model are the implications of a binding countercyclical requirement
on bank loan procyclicality, the monetary transmission mechanism and accordingly the
optimal monetary policy rule, the impact of such a requirement on the output-in
ation
variability tradeo, and the optimal degree of countercyclicalty of the capital rule. Section
3 adds nancial stability dimension to the analysis by looking at a richer model where
procyclical bank lending behavior generates cycles that resemble the build-up and crash
2of an asset price bubble. In so doing, we hope to highlight the precise nature of diculties
facing a central bank in using monetary policy to address the problem. The model is then
used to evaluate the merits of implementing a regulatory policy with an aim to foster
nancial stability. Finally, Section 4 reviews the most important conclusions.
2 Countercyclical capital requirement and optimal
monetary policy
At the core of the global nancial reform agenda to be presented at the Seoul G20 Leaders
summit in November 2010 is the new global minimum capital standards that comprise
a higher minimum capital ratio, a conservation capital buer, and a countercyclical
buer add-on. Our interest is on the countercyclical capital buer scheme which is
macroprudential in nature and also the most likely to implicate the bank lending channel
of monetary policy transmission.
A few recent papers, all of which are theoretical, have investigated the interaction
between countercyclical capital requirement and monetary policy. Angeloni and Faia
(2009) and N'Diaye (2009) both nd that countercyclical capital requirement is good for
monetary policymakers and the economy as a whole. The same nding is reported by
Angelini et al. (2010) except for the case when the macroprudential authority has more
bargaining power than the monetary policy authority in a game theoretic setting in which
the optimal capital rule is perversely procyclical. However, these works are based on a
complex DSGE setup which not only makes them vulnerable to model-specic results
but also makes it dicult to delineate the mechanisms through which the two policies
interact. In this section, we take a step back and analyze their interactions in a standard
macroeconomic model commonly used for monetary policy analysis.
2.1 The Model
The model employed in this section is a variant of the dynamic model used by Cecchetti
and Li (2005) to study optimal monetary policy design in the presence of a xed minimum
capital requirement for banks. Basically, what they did is to append a simple banking
sector  a la Bernanke and Blinder (1988) to an otherwise standard macroeconomic model.
We build on their contribution by considering further the case of a countercyclical capital
buer add-on recently announced by the governing body of the BCBS (2010) for the
Basel III capital regime.1
1The other main dierence between our model and that of Cecchetti and Li (2005) is that their
macroeconomic block is purely backward looking whereas ours also features the roles of the expected
future output gaps and expected future in
ation in determining the current output gap and current
in
ation as emphasized by modern macro economic analysis.
3The evolution of the model economy when there is no capital requirement for banks
is described by the following set of equations:
xt = xt 1 + (1   )Etxt+1   (it   Ett+1)   #(i
b
t   Ett+1) + "t,  2 [0;1];;# > 0;
(2.1)
t = t 1 + (1   )Ett+1 + xt + ut,  2 [0;1]; > 0; (2.2)
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dt = dxxt   di(it   Ett+1), dx;di > 0; (2.5)
nt = nxxt, nx > 0; (2.6)
where xt is the output gap, t is in
ation, it is the nominal interest rate (the central
banks monetary policy instrument), ib
t is the nominal lending rate, "t is a demand shock,
ut is a cost-push shock, bd
t is real loan demand, bs
t is real loan supply, dt is real deposits, nt
is real bank capital, and Et is the expectation operator. The two stochastic disturbances




Equation 2.1 describes a forward-looking aggregate demand equation (an expecta-
tional IS curve). It diers from a conventional hybrid IS curve in the presence of the
ex ante real lending rate term. As specied the contemporaneous output gap depends
positively on its lagged and expected future values, but negatively on the ex ante real
policy rate and the ex ante real lending rate. Equation 2.2 is a standard hybrid new
Keynesian Phillips curve that relates current in
ation to both lagged and expected future
in
ation, the output gap and a cost-push shock. Equations 2.3-2.6 make up our banking
sector block. Real loan demand (equation 2.3) is assumed to be increasing in the level
of economic activity, but decreasing with the real lending rate. The evolution of real
loan supply is described by equation 2.4 which is a log-linearized version of a simple
bank balance sheet identity Bt = Dt + Nt where the uppercase letters without the time
subscript denote the steady-state values of the respective variables. Real (non-interest-
bearing) bank deposits vary positively with the output gap, but negatively with the real
policy rate, while real bank capital is assumed to be increasing only in the output gap.
In a limiting case when the structural parameters  and  which capture the degree of
backwardness in equations 2.1 and 2.2 are both equal to unity, the above model economy
reduces to the one examined by Cecchetti and Li (2005).
In this model, monetary policy works through two channels. The rst is the
conventional interest rate channel. The second is the bank lending channel, captured
by the presence of the lending rate term in the aggregate demand equation and the
4specications of the banking sector block. By making bank capital a positive function of
output, there is no need to resort to a binding reserve requirement constraint as typically
assumed in the literature. In our model, an increase in the central banks policy rate
lowers the level of both real deposits and economic activity which in turn lead to the
reduction on the right-hand side of bank balance sheet and through the balance sheet
identity a simultaneous reduction in bank loan supply on the left-hand side. Provided
that real loan demand is not too sensitive to the output gap, the lending rate will increase
with the policy rate, eectively amplifying the impact of the monetary policy contraction.
Before proceeding, we note that the model can be simplied further. Equating
the expression for loan demand to the expression for loan supply and substituting the
expressions for deposits and bank capital into the resulting loan market equilibrium
condition yields the equilibrium real lending rate in terms of output gap and the real
policy rate. Plugging the expression for the equilibrium real lending rate into equation
2.1 results in a familiar conventional hybrid IS curve:
!
uxt = xt 1 + (1   )Etxt+1   ( + )(it   Ett+1) + "t; (2.10)















di > 0. The superscript
u denotes that this is the unconstrained case. Equation 2.10 together with equation 2.2
gives a complete description of our model economy when banks are unconstrained by the
regulatory capital requirement.
In order to analyze optimal monetary policy, we assume that the central banks
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 + (it+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 1)
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(2.7)
where  is the discount factor. This specication of the central banks loss function
re
ects the widespread agreement over the practical objectives of monetary policy in the
literature.2 The parameters  and  represent respectively the weights on output gap
stabilization and interest rate smoothing relative to in
ation stabilization.
To study the implications of countercyclical capital regulation on optimal mone-
tary policy, we assume that the prudential authorities impose the following minimum













where Yt and Y denote respectively output and its steady state, c and 
1 are positive
constants, and 
2  0. In what follows, we refer to the case in which 
2 = 0 as the
2See, for example, Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) and Ehrmann and Smets (2003)
5xed-capital-requirement case and the case in which 
2 > 0 as the countercyclical-capital-
requirement case.
The specication 2.8 is intended to mimic the newly announced Basel III capital
regime. The parameter c can be thought of as the sum of the minimum capital ratio and
the capital conservation buer while the second term in the bracket captures the essence
of countercyclical capital buer add-on in which the amount of the required extra capital
rises and falls with economic cycle.3
In this simple setup where total bank assets comprises only bank loans and there are
no dierential risk weights, the capital ratio is the same as the (inverse of the) leverage
ratio analyzed in Section 3. However, given the specic ways this ratio is imposed in the
two sections, it is more apt to interpret the ratio as the BIS ratio in this section and as
the leverage ratio in Section 3.
For simplicity, we assume that, once imposed, the capital-requirement constraint
holds with equality. While this assumption is admittedly unrealistic, we note that it is a
rather common assumption in the literature. See, for example, Angeloni and Faia (2009),
N'Diaye (2009) and Covas and Fugita (2010). In addition, if we take the results from
Cecchetti and Li (2005) that optimal monetary policy conduct in the face of a capital
requirement in their model has the central bank switch back and forth between two
interest rate rules that correspond to two distinct states of the world: one in which
the capital constraint always binds and one in which it never does, for the sake of
elucidating the impacts of the capital constraint on the dynamics of the economy and
optimal monetary policy, it may not be too costly to abstract from the state of the world
in which the capital constraint binds on and o.
Intuitively, imposing an always binding capital constraint turns an upward-sloping
loan supply curve into a vertical one (Figure 1a.). To illustrate the procyclical eect
of a xed capital requirement and the countercyclical property of the Basel III-type
requirement in our model, let us assume momentarily that the loan demand schedule
is unaected by output movements4 and that the output elasticities of loan supply are
the same for the no-capital-requirement case and the xed-capital-requirement one. The
second assumption5 forces the loan supply schedules in both cases to shift by the same
horizontal distance for a given change in the output amount which together with the rst
assumption simplies graphical presentation.
3The latest Basel II announcement leaves open to national authorities as to what should be used
as a conditioning variable for the countercyclical capital buer. The ideal choice should presumably be
the one that best re
ects the buildup of system-wide risk. Given that such criterion is irrelevant for the
model in this section, we simply follow the literature in using the deviation of GDP from its steady state
as the reference cycle.
4This is exactly the condition assumed by Cecchetti and Li (2005) for their dynamic model.
5In our model, this is accomplished by setting the elasticity with respect to the output gap of real
deposits equal to that of real bank capital. In reality, the latter is generally larger than the former,
implying a larger shift of the vertical supply curve which strengthens the degree of procyclicality induced
by the xed capital requirement.
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Figure 1: Loan market equilibrium
From a partial equilibrium perspective, an increase in aggregate economic activ-
ity shifts the loan supply schedules in both the unconstrained and the xed-capital-
requirement cases to the right (Figure 1b.). Compared to the unconstrained case, the
xed-capital-requirement case has the loan supply schedule intersect the loan demand
schedule at a higher loan amount and a lower real lending rate. Given the specication
of aggregate demand, the lower real lending rate would stimulate output even further.
Thus, despite the fact that we x the initial shifts of the two supply schedules to be the
same, the nal equilibrium in the xed capital requirement case would have the vertical
supply schedule move further rightward due to a multiplier eect.
Having shown the association between one form of nancial-sector procyclicality
(in which procyclical bank lending amplies the business cycle) and the xed capital
requirement in our model, we turn to the countercyclical property of a Basel III-typed
capital requirement. In this latter case, the required capital ratio rises with an eco-
nomic expansion, forcing banks to moderate their loan book expansion and eectively
pulling the loan supply schedule back to the left. Compared with those under the xed-
capital-requirement case, the equilibrium bank loans under the countercyclical-capital-
requirement case will be lower while the equilibrium loan rate will be higher and as a result
output will be less stimulated. Put dierently, with countercyclical capital requirement,
bank loans will be less procyclical and the business cycle will be less amplied.
Log-linearizing equation 2.8 yields
b
s






Replacing equation 2.4 with equation 2.9 and following the same simplication steps
7yields
!
cxt = xt 1 + (1   )Etxt+1   (it   Ett+1) + "t; (2.100)









. The superscript c denotes that this is the capital-
constrained case. It is noteworthy here that the presence of a capital constraint aects
only the aggregate demand equation, with the aggregate supply equation unchanged.
2.2 Model Parameterization
Rather than estimating the model from the data, we adopt the following calibration
strategy. First, we deliberately parameterize relevant parameters in a way that makes
!u equal to one. With this parameterization, the aggregate demand equation under
the unconstrained case 2.10 becomes isomorphic to a standard hybrid aggregate demand
equation which allows us to adopt certain parameter values that have already been
estimated by others. Given that the unconstrained case largely characterizes the real
world when viewed over a long time series, our parameterization scheme is not too
unreasonable. On the plus side, it allows us to sidestep certain data and estimation issues
which are not central to our illustrative analysis while at the same time still providing
some realism.
Second, we note that the aggregate demand equation when banks are constrained
by a capital requirement diers from the aggregate demand equation when banks are
unconstrained (2.1') in two places: the coecient on the current output gap and the
coecient on the ex ante real interest rate, of which only the former depends on the degree
of countercyclicality of the capital constraint. To highlight their respective implications
on the dynamics of the economy and optimal monetary policy, we also parameterize !c
when 
2 = 0 to one so that the aggregate demand equation in the xed capital requirement
case diers from the unconstrained case only to the extent of interest rate elasticity of
output.
Table 1 lists the values of model parameters. For ;;;2
"; and 2
u; we use the
values from the estimated euro area model of Ehrmann and Smets (2003). We choose the
Ehrmann and Smets model for our illustrative analysis for two reasons. First, European
banks had been at the center of the Basel III discussions before its eventual announce-
ment. Second, the model is in annual frequency which matches the 12-month time
horizon that undercapitalized banks need to meet the additional countercyclical capital
requirement under the Basel III regime. The unconventional parameters #;bx;bi;dx;di
and nx are chosen under the constraints !u = !c(
2 = 0) = 1 and  +  = 0:06 (the
value of interest elasticity of the output gap in the Ehrmann and Smets (2003) model).
The ratio N=B and c are set to 0.105, the sum of the minimum capital ratio and the
conservation capital buer under Basel III. This left 
1 and 
2 as the free parameters
for the countercyclical capital buer calibration. For the baseline parameterization, we





























set them equal to 1,000 and 110, respectively, which together with the above parameter
values give 
 = 1:3. In obtaining these values, we simulate the model under the xed-
capital-requirement case 1,000 times and search for 
1 and 
2 that make the simulated
countercyclical capital buer not only falling within a range of 0-2.5% but also staying
near zero most of the time as prescribed by the Basel III announcement. Figure 2 shows
the simulated path of the overall capital requirement for the rst 150 time periods.
Finally, we assume for the central banks period loss function that  = 0:5 and
 = 0:1 and that the discount factor  = 0:96 given that the Ehrmann and Smets (2003)
model is based on annual data.
2.3 A Simple Limiting Case
As a prelude to the simulation results, it is instructive to examine a simple limiting case
where a closed-form solution is available. As it is well known, closed-form solutions can
be derived when the central bank is not concerned about interest rate variability and the
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Figure 2: Simulated capital ratio
that the backward-looking case has been worked out in detail by Cecchetti and Li (2005),
we choose the forward-looking case for the analysis in this subsection.

















!xt = Etxt+1   (it   Ett+1) + "t; (2.11)
t = Ett+1 + xt + ut; (2.12)
where, given the aforementioned calibration scheme, ! (unconstrained case) = ! (xed
requirement case) = 1 < ! (countercyclical requirement case) and  (unconstrained
case) >  (xed requirement case) =  (countercyclical requirement case). Without loss
of generality, we replace the Phillips curve 2.2 with a standard new Keynesian Phillips
curve 2.12 so as to also enable comparison with a basic new Keynesian model.












Equation 2.13 highlights the monetary transmission mechanism in our model. As in the
basic new Keynesian model, the current output gap depends not only on the current
policy rate but also on its expected future path. What is new according to equation 2.13
is that the presence of a binding capital constraint weakens the transmission of monetary
10policy through a smaller  and a larger ! which together lower the sensitivity of the
output gap to the current and the expected real policy rates.
It is noteworthy that the eect of  is constant through time while the eect of !
increases over time. Mechanically, ! captures the responsiveness of the current output
gap to the expected future output gap, with the larger !, the smaller the in
uence of
the latter on the former. This further weakens the link between the expected future
policy rates and the current output gap which is central to models with forward-looking
features.
On the other hand, a larger ! reduces the impacts of the current and the expected
demand shocks on the current output gap. This latter property will become important
when we discuss optimal monetary policy for the full model in the next subsection.
For the problem at hand, the solution to the central banks optimization is simple.
When the central banks loss function contains only output gap and in
ation stabilization
objectives and there is no constraint on the zero lower bound (ZLB) on the nominal
interest rate, optimal monetary policy calls for a complete oset of the impact of the
demand disturbance ut, leaving the dynamics of the equilibrium output gap and in
ation
independent of the aggregate demand equation. More importantly for our analysis, this
means that the presence of a capital requirement constraint, whether xed or countercycli-
cal, has no bearing on the equilibrium output gap and in
ation processes and consequently
the value of the loss function if the central bank conducts its policy optimally. Viewed
this way (that the only relevant constraint for the central banks optimization problem
is the aggregate supply curve), the Cecchetti and Li (2005) result that the equilibrium
output gap and in
ation processes depend only on the supply shock in a manner that is
independent of the capital constraint is not surprising.
It remains to examine the specic form of an optimal monetary policy rule in this
simple limiting case. The equilibrium concept we adopt for this purpose is the timeless
perspective commitment equilibrium advocated by Woodford (2003). We note however
that assuming the generally inferior discretion equilibrium does not alter our conclusions
about the implications of the capital constraint on optimal monetary policy, whether in
this simple limiting case or a more general one.
Under the commitment equilibrium, the equilibrium output gap and in
ation pro-
cesses are given by


















2 < 1, c2 =   
[1+(1 c1)]+2 < 0. See Clarida et al.
(1999) or Walsh (2010) for detailed derivation.
11Using the aggregate demand equation 2.11 to back out the equilibrium interest rate


























Equation 2.14 reveals two important observations. First, the optimal policy rate response
to a demand shock is larger when the capital constraint is binding (due to a smaller ).
Intuitively, the presence of a binding capital constraint reduces the ability of the policy
rate to neutralize the eect of a given demand shock. So a larger change in the policy
rate is required. The impact of a smaller  also applies to the policy rate response to a
supply shock although in this case the in
ation-output stabilization tradeo causes the
central bank to only partially oset the eect of a supply shock.
Secondly, the more countercyclical the capital requirement is (as captured by a
larger !), the larger the optimal policy rate response to a supply shock. This is a
consequence of our earlier result that the eectiveness of monetary policy transmission
mechanism is further reduced by the degree of countercyclicality of the binding capital
constraint.
2.4 Simulation Results
The simple limiting case examined in the previous subsection provides several important
insights into how to think about optimal monetary policy conducts in the presence of
a binding capital requirement constraint for banks. However, not all of the results of
the previous subsection carry to a more realistic setting where the underlying economy
exhibits inertia in the output gap and in
ation processes and the central bank faces costs
of interest rate adjustment. The latter, in particular, renders a complete oset of demand
shocks suboptimal. As a result, the equilibrium output gap and in
ation processes will
necessarily depend on the specication of the aggregate demand equation and hence the
form of the capital constraint. It also follows that the value of the loss function will no
longer be invariant to the regulatory regime.
Under commitment, the optimal policy rules and their associated losses in the
calibrated model are given by
Unconstrained (loss=42.28)
it = 0:58it 1 + 0:60xt 1 + 0:38t 1 + 1:37"t + 0:78ut   0:62x;t 1   0:22;t 1
Fixed capital requirement (loss=48.38)
it = 0:63it 1 + 0:63xt 1 + 0:40t 1 + 1:44"t + 0:83ut   0:51x;t 1   0:21;t 1
12Fixed capital requirement (loss=45.84)
it = 0:71it 1 + 0:35xt 1 + 0:68t 1 + 0:80"t + 1:41ut   0:38x;t 1   0:23;t 1
where x and  are the Lagrange multipliers on the aggregate demand equation and
the aggregate supply equation, respectively.
In all three cases, the optimal policy rules call for an increase in the policy rate
in response to both positive output gap and in
ation developments as captured by
their coecients on the lagged output gap, lagged in
ation, and the two stochastic
disturbances. With respect to a cost shock, the result is the same as in the simple limiting
case. Specically, the optimal interest rate response to a cost shock when the capital
requirement is countercyclical is more aggressive than when the capital requirement is
constant, which in turn is more aggressive than when banks are unconstrained. The
dierence from the simple limiting case is with respect to an optimal interest rate response
to a demand shock. It is no longer the case that the optimal policy response to a demand
shock is invariant to the degree of countercyclicality of the binding capital constraint.
Indeed, for the baseline parameterization, an optimal rate response to a demand shock
in the presence of a binding countercyclical capital requirement is even smaller than the
unconstrained case.
When the dynamics of the economy depends also on the aggregate demand equation,
the benet of a countercyclical capital requirement comes into play. An important insight
from the simple limiting case is that countercyclical capital requirement reduces the
impact of a demand shock on the current output gap. This property is inconsequential
when demand shocks are completely oset. In the present case where there are residual
demand shocks, requiring banks to hold more capital during an economic expansion thus
aids the central banks aggregate demand management.
In terms of central banks losses, the loss is the smallest when there is no capital
constraint, followed by the countercyclical-capital-requirement case, with the xed-capital
requirement case delivering the largest loss. This ordering should not be interpreted as the
unconstrained case being the rst best and the countercyclical-capital-requirement case as
the second best however. Later when we analyze the optimal degree of countercyclicality
of the capital constraint, we will show that there are instances in which a countercyclical
capital requirement is associated with a smaller loss than having no constraint at all.
Rather, the key message here is that, despite the fact that a countercyclical capital
requirement weakens the transmission mechanism of monetary policy relative to a xed
capital requirement, in the end the central bank is better o with a countercyclical capital
requirement than with a xed capital requirement.
Figure 3 shows the impulse responses of the policy rate, the output gap, bank loans,
and in
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Figure 3: Impulse responses to a unitary demand shock
capital-requirement case, and the countercyclical-capital-requirement case. As would
have been expected from the preceding discussion, the initial policy response is mildest in
the countercyclical-capital-requirement case. That output and bank loans also 
uctuate
less in this case is also evidenced by their impulse responses. Through the presence of
the lagged output gap term in the hybrid aggregate demand equation, a countercyclical
capital constraint also reduces the persistence in output gap movements. This further
lessens the impact of demand shocks on the output gap and accordingly bank loans.
Finally, while in
ation in the countercyclical-capital-requirement regime is less volatile
than that in the xed-capital-requirement regime, it is more volatile than that in the
unconstrained regimes which causes the associated policy response to persist longer. This
is the adverse consequence of countercyclical capital requirement. Put simply, there is
no free lunch. While countercyclical capital requirement helps moderate the impact of
demand shocks on output, it reduces the ability of the central bank to control in
ation
through the weakened monetary transmission mechanism.
The contrast between the benet and the cost of a countercyclical requirement
on macroeconomic dynamics is most visible in Figure 4 which traces out the impulse
responses of the policy rate, the output gap, bank loans, and in
ation to a unitary
cost shock. In the countercyclical-capital-requirement case, a cost shock invokes a very
strong policy response, twice to three times as much as the other cases under the given
parameterization. Even with such a strong response, in
ation remains the most volatile
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Figure 4: Impulse responses to a unitary cost shock
and bank loans are less variable with a countercyclical capital constraint.
Putting all these pieces together, the output gap is least volatile with a counter-
cyclical requirement, followed in order by the unconstrained case and the xed-capital-
requirement case. On the other hand, in
ation is most volatile with a countercyclical
requirement followed in order by the xed-capital-requirement case and the unconstrained
case. That is, countercyclical capital requirement is good for output gap stabilization but
bad for in
ation stabilization.
In light of the dierential impacts of a countercyclical capital requirement constraint
on output and in
ation variability, it is natural to examine the output-in
ation variability
tradeo advocated by Taylor (1979) for comparison of alternative monetary policy rules.
Figure 5a plots combinations of the unconditional variances of the output gap and
in
ation obtained by varying the central banks weight on output gap stabilization ()
from 0 to 100 under the three cases of interest. Also labeled in the gure are the points
on each of the tradeo frontier for the baseline parameterization ( = 0:5). Figure 5b
superimposes on Figure 5a additional tradeo curves associated with dierent values of
!.
Figure 5 highlights several important results. First, under the baseline param-
eterization, the output-in
ation variability tradeo under the countercyclical-capital-
requirement case dominates the xed-capital requirement case, but is dominated by the
unconstrained case. That is, under the baseline parametrization, the unconstrained case
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ation variability tradeo. The same however cannot be said for high degrees of
requirement countercylicality. As the degree of countercylicality of a capital requirement
increases, the tradeo frontier pivots to the left. For high values of !, parts of the
tradeo frontiers even lie below the tradeo frontier under the unconstrained case. The
superior tradeo at high values of ! however comes at the expense of higher interest rate
volatility (simulation results not shown). So it is not clear whether a higher degree of
countercyclicality will always be preferred by an optimizing central bank. Subsection 2.6
will take on this issue in detail. Finally, a countercyclical capital constraint shortens the
variability frontier. The higher the value of !, the shorter the tradeo curve and the
higher the minimum level of in
ation variability a central bank can achieve. This is the
consequence of our earlier nding that countercyclical capital requirement interferes with
the central banks in
ation stabilization. For an in
ation nutter (King (1997)), a xed
capital requirement may be preferred to a countercyclical one.
2.5 Countercyclical Capital Requirement and Optimal Taylor
Rules
A large part of the modern monetary policy literature chooses to focus on simple instru-
ment rules like the so-called Taylor (1993) rule that responds to only contemporaneous
the output gap and in
ation as opposed to complicated optimal commitment rules. The
justications are that in many cases simple Taylor-like rules yield similar macroeconomic
stability to optimal commitment rules and are also a reasonable approximation of actual
policy making. It is therefore of interest to also examine the implications of countercycli-
cal capital requirement on the form of optimal Taylor rules and their performances using
the same loss function as in the previous subsection.
Table 2 reports the value of the loss function and the optimal reaction coecients of
a Taylor rule with interest rate smoothing for dierent values of !. The same information
16for the unconstrained case is also reported in the last line of the table for comparison.
Table 2: Optimal Taylor rules and degree of countercyclicality
! Loss it 1 t yt
1.0 51.03 0.98 1.53 0.83
1.05 49.27 0.97 1.51 0.74
1.10 48.16 0.97 1.51 0.67
1.15 47.55 0.96 1.51 0.61
1.20 47.29 0.96 1.51 0.55
1.25 47.29 0.96 1.51 0.51
1.30 47.47 0.95 1.51 0.47
1.35 47.79 0.95 1.52 0.43
1.40 48.21 0.95 1.52 0.40
unconstrained 44.36 0.99 1.51 0.85
Several observations deserve to be highlighted. First, as ! increases from unity, the
central banks loss becomes smaller. However, after a certain point, the value of the loss
picks up again, suggesting that there is an optimal degree of countercyclicality of the
capital constraint. This issue will be explored further in the next subsection.
Second, the optimal coecients on the lagged interest rate and in
ation do not
changed much with the degree of countercyclicality. This observation is in sharp contrast
with the third observation which concerns the optimal coecient on the output gap. For
the baseline parameterization (! = 1:30), the optimal coecient on the output gap falls
by nearly a half from 0.83 to 0.47 from the xed-capital-requirement case (! = 1). The
reduced output response is a re
ection of our earlier result that the greater the degree of
countercyclicality of a capital requirement, the smaller the need for the central bank to
stabilize output.
Given the signicant impact of the degree of countercylicality on the optimal Taylor
rule, it is of interest to see what will happen to the equilibrium outcomes if the central
bank is not aware of the implications of the countercyclical capital constraint on the
dynamics of the economy and remains committed to the optimal Taylor rule for the
unconstrained case. In this case, the central banks loss and the unconditional variances
of the output gap, in
ation, and the policy rate are respectively 47.87 (compared to
47.47), 0.68 (compared to 0.72), 1.37 (compared to 1.36), and 21.32 (compared to 20.26).
Qualitatively, by committing to the Taylor rule under the unconstrained case, the central
bank overreacts to output gap developments. The central banks non-optimizing behavior
brings down output gap variability at the expense of both in
ation variability and interest
rate variability. Overall, the latter two outweighs the former, resulting in a larger
loss for the central bank. Nevertheless, the loss dierential is only about one percent,
suggesting that the central banks failure to internalize the implications of the binding
capital constraint may not matter much quantitatively.
172.6 Optimal Degree of Countercyclicality
The analysis thus far concerns optimal monetary policy for a given degree of capital
requirement countercyclicality. This subsection takes one step further to examine the
optimal policy combination. This problem is best addressed by assuming, not too
unrealistically, that the central bank is also in charge of the capital buer calibration. In
the context of our model, the central bank would at the outset x the desired degree of
countercyclicality of the capital buer in conjunction with monetary policy to minimize
the value of the loss function.6
For ease of exposition, we assume that the central bank chooses directly the pa-
rameter ! as the additional choice variable. The optimal value of ! will likely depend on
several parameters. Rather than providing a full set of comparative statics, this subsection
mentions two considerations that are likely to be of high practical importance.
The rst consideration is the relative magnitude of the variances of the demand and
the cost shocks. An important result from the earlier subsections is that countercyclical
capital requirement is good for osetting the impact of demand shocks but bad for the
performance of monetary policy in the face of supply shocks. Therefore, the optimal
degree of countercyclicality in an economy where supply disturbances dominate will be
lower than that in an economy where demand disturbances dominate, holding other things
equal.
The second consideration concerns the weight the central bank places on output
gap stabilization. Because countercyclical capital requirement helps the central bank
stabilize the output gap at the expense of in
ation stabilization. The optimal degree of
countercyclicality should be higher as the central banks weight on output gap stabilization
increases. Figure 6 conrms this intuition. The optimal value of ! indeed rises with the
value of . For our baseline parameterization where  = 0:5, the optimal value of ! is
1.21, below our baseline value of 1.30.7 For  = 1:0 (the central bank places an equal
weight on output and in
ation stabilization), the optimal value of ! is 1.46.8
Figure 6 also illustrates another important point. When  is high enough, it is
possible for the central bank to achieve a lower level of loss with a countercyclical capital
requirement than without a capital constraint at all. Thus, provided that the central
banks objective function approximates well the true social preference, in certain societies,
6An alternative approach is to assume a separate macroprudential authority engaging in
cooperative/non-cooperative games with a central bank. See Angelini et al. (2010) for an application of
this approach.
7The loss dierential however is marginal (45.56 versus 45.84), suggesting that over a certain range,
the degree of countercylicality does not matter much to the central banks loss.
8Interestingly, the optimal value of ! for an in
ation nutter central bank ( = 0) is 0.74,
implying that the optimal capital requirement is procyclical. The threshold  that makes a xed
requirement optimal is 0.17. These conclusions however ignore the nancial stability benet of capital
requirement countercyclicality and the nancial stability cost of increase bank lending procyclicality
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Figure 6: Central bank's loss
particularly ones that may care strongly about output stabilization, implementing an
appropriately calibrated countercyclical capital buer is ultimately welfare improving.
3 Policy Coordination in a Model with Financial In-
stability
As insightful as it is, the model of the preceding section lacks one important dimension:
nancial stability { the very objective of macroprudential regulation. There is neither
boom/bust nor bank failure associated with the bank lending cycle generated by the
assumed simple banking sector block. The use of a macroprudential tool (the counter-
cyclical capital buer) to restrain bank lending behavior in that model is solely for the
sake of economic stabilization and not for the resilience of the nancial system as strongly
emphasized by the post-crisis consensus.
Unfortunately, when it comes to nancial stability modeling, there is no standard
canonical model to rely on for policy analysis. In particular, models based on a dynamic
general equilibrium concept, whether the likes of the model in the preceding subsection
or their larger DSGE cousins, are generally poor at incorporating nancial instability.9
This section thus opts for an alternative model that is less conventional but richer in
nancial stability dimension.
Our model relies on two central elements in explaining the emergence of nancial
instability. The rst is the basic procyclicality mechanism which works to propagate and
magnify shocks, while the second, the path dependence feature, enables the degree of
9Two notable exceptions are Filardo (2007) for a small model and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) for a
DSGE model.
19procyclicality to accumulate over time. Specically, when the strength of procyclicality
itself is procyclical (namely it rises with positive shocks), a boom automatically increases
the degree of nancial fragility, sowing the seed for an outsized crash later on once the
shock dissipates. Given these two mechanisms, mere temporary shocks can lead to bubble-
and-crash phenomena.
Technically, the source of basic procyclicality in our model derives from the mark-to-
market and banks' balance sheet adjustment mechanism, described by Shleifer and Vishny
(2010) and Adrian and Shin (2010). We extend their work by highlighting that, when the
model is cast in a dynamic setting, there is a path dependence feature: as balance sheet
size expands, the sensitivity to mark-to-market gains or losses grows, which captures
the idea of time-varying nancial fragility. A positive shock to asset price raises banks'
capital via a mark-to-market gain, which encourages further balance sheet expansion and
brings about increased fragility. When the shock dissipates, the high level of asset price
becomes unsustainable and the correction necessarily excessive due to the accumulated
fragility during the run-up.
It will be shown that, in this context, the use of policy interest rate (or indeed any
discretionary monetary policy) in pursuit of nancial stability is subject to a number of
severe limitations. On the other hand, macroprudential regulation in rule-based form,
which has a structural and long-term objective in mind, can help weaken the degree of
procyclicality and arrest the risk of nancial instability at source. While macroprudential
tools may vary, they should share a common objective of ensuring a structurally more
resilient nancial system.
3.1 The Model
There is a single asset in the economy, in xed supply of size N. The asset is the
securitized loans extended to the real sector, and the banks' loan supply is modeled
as the demand for this asset10. Banks nance their asset holdings from either equity
or short-term debt. The asset can also be bought by passive investors, whose asset
demand function slopes downward with asset price. Time is discrete and divided into
three periods, t 2 f1;2;3g. At time t, denote asset's price by pt, banks' total holding of
asset by nt, banks' equity by et, and banks' liability by dt. The asset market equilibrium
condition requires that the sum of demand for assets from banks and passive investors
equals the total supply N in each period. In period 1, the equilibrium asset price and
banks' asset holdings are exogenously given (which is consistent with a steady state, to
be dened later).
10See Bernanke and Blinder (1988) for a similar approach. This assumption is made purely for
convenience, to bypass explicit modeling of borrowers. For a predominantly non-securitized banking
system, the assumption should be interpreted as saying banks have an exposure to the asset that their
borrowers invest in for instance through the collateral value.
20In the beginning of periods 2, the central bank designs policy conguration before
observing shocks. The permissible class of policy instruments includes (1) the policy
interest rate it and (2) regulatory requirements that set limits on banks' total asset or
leverage. In period 2, the asset market is then subject to a temporary shock, modeled as
a shift in passive demand, causing the asset market to re-equilibrate. In the nal period,
the passive demand returns to its original position, and the asset market is allowed to go
through nal adjustment. We will distinguish between a nimble policy maker who can
reset its policy in period 3, and a clumsy who cannot do so as it is constrained by the
long lag with which the policy instrument works.
At the end of the nal period, the asset yields a return randomly drawn from a
distribution with known expected value. Passive investors are risk-averse and therefore
scale down their asset demand as price rises, in line with lower risk-adjusted expected
return. A higher interest rate raises return on a competing risk-free asset, and lowers
passive demand for assets. Passive demand, denoted by t(it;pt) 2 [0;N], is therefore a
decreasing function of both price and policy interest rate.
Banks only invest in one type of asset, therefore their asset demand is eectively
their balance sheet size. Banks are risk-neutral and aim to maximize the net present value
of investment. The asset's expected return is assumed to be suciently large such that the
net present value is always positive, so that banks would always want to raise more debt
to increase their asset holding. Their ability to issue debt is however constrained by their
capital endowment. Specically, in period t banks need to maintain a capital-to-asset




Clearly, the inverse 1=ht(it) is simply leverage ratio.
We choose to remain agnostic about the exact source and functional form of ht(it),
except that @ht(it)=@it > 0 for any t,11 and instead focus on the role that leverage plays in
transmitting the eect of monetary policy to asset market equilibrium. We let ht depend
11The micro-foundation for ht(it) can be motivated in a number of ways. In the presence of asymmetric
information and agency costs, ht(it) can be interpreted as the creditors' demand that banks hold a
sucient level of capital in order to retain enough `skin in the game' for eort to be credible in the spirit
of Holmstrom and Tirole (1997). Higher interest rate lowers returns to asset in present value terms,
making agency cost more binding and hence forcing banks to hold more capital. In this sense, the ratio
ht(it) is a haircut required by banks' creditors. Shleifer and Vishny (2010) adopt this interpretation and
consider the special case of constant ht(it) = h. An alternative interpretation is that ht(it) is chosen
voluntarily by banks to meet some objective; for instance in Adrian and Shin (2010), banks aim to stay
a
oat in each period by holding enough capital to cushion against the worst-case loss. In their model,
ht(it) is then derived from the value-at-risk constraint that banks strive to meet in each period. Higher
interest rate lowers the present value of asset return, raising the worst case loss and making the value-
at-risk constraint more binding. More generally, the dependence of ht(it) on it can also be interpreted
as a representation of the `risk-taking' channel of monetary policy transmission (Borio and Zhu (2008)).
In any interpretation, @ht(it)=@it > 0, for any t.
21on time t solely to allow for the possibility of discretionary regulatory policy eecting
change on banks' leverage so that, for xed it = i, h1(i) 6= h2(i) 6= h3(i). Absent this
regulatory policy action, we assume that h1(i) = h2(i) = h3(i) for any given i so that there
is no inherent `leverage cycle' in our model (unlike the mechanism in Geanakoplos (2009),
for example, where leverage is time-varying indicating shifts in risk-taking behavior).
The asset price pt and the amount of net asset buying/selling by banks are deter-
mined by the market equilibrium condition, which in turn denes the state variables'
dynamics. The net asset buying in equilibrium, denoted by Bt, is nanced by more
borrowing, hence:
dt = dt 1 + ptBt (3.2)
At the beginning of each period, banks' assets are marked to market and any price
appreciation increases the equity value of the banks:
et = nt 1pt   dt 1 (3.3)
3.2 Genesis of Financial Instability
Let us begin by formulating the asset market equilibrium condition. Substituting equa-
tions 3.2 and 3.3 into 3.1, we get
ht(it) =
nt 1pt   dt 1
pt (nt 1 + Bt)
(3.4)
Invert this, using the balance sheet identity dt 1  (1 ht 1(it 1))nt 1pt 1 and the asset











for 0  nt  N.
Banks' and passive investors' demand together make up the total asset demand.
The asset market clears when the total asset demand equals asset supply, i.e.
N = t(it;pt) + nt(it;pt) (3.6)
We now consider the implications of the model within period (static) and across periods
(dynamic), respectively. To focus attention on the inherent properties of the asset market
equilibrium, we will assume xed policy, i.e. ht(it) = h for all t, throughout the rest of
this section before relaxing this assumption in section 3.3.
22N


















Figure 7: Procyclicality and Static Implications
3.2.1 Propagation and indeterminacy
It is evident from equation 3.5 that banks' demand function is upward sloping in asset
price. This unorthodox shape of the demand curve stems from marking to market
originating in equation 3.3, whereby a rise in asset price induces a capital gain accrued
to banks, strengthening their balance sheets and allowing them to increase asset holdings
while still respecting the leverage constraint. The upward-sloping demand is the basic
procyclicality engine in our model. Any shock that induces price appreciation is amplied
by the expansion of banks' balance sheets and debt accumulation. When procyclicality is
strong enough, self-fullling expectations may take over fundamentals, as we now show.
The determination of asset market equilibrium is schematically illustrated in Figure
7. In both panels, the asset demand by banks should be read from left to right, while
passive demand from right to left. The intersection point of the two demand curves denes
the market equilibrium. Consider rst the left panel, in which there is a unique interior
stable equilibrium. Because of banks' upward-sloping demand function, a shock that
induces an upward shift in the passive demand curve, say by , would lead to a larger-
than- increase in the equilibrium asset price. In contrast, if both demand functions
were downward sloping, the increase in asset price would have been less than one-for-one.
Moreover, the passive investors end up holding less assets in the new equilibrium despite
the initial demand shift. This is because they are priced out of the market by banks, who,
in response to the initial price rise, manage to raise asset demand via stronger balance
sheets.
A unique stable equilibrium is not the only possibility. In the right panel of Figure
7, the interior equilibrium becomes unstable, and a small rise in price would lead to
23positive excess demand, putting further upward pressure on price. In this case, there
are two stable equilibria, both of which are corner solutions where banks either price all
passive investors out totally, or exit the market altogether. Which equilibrium will be
borne out is indeterminate. The indeterminacy can be interpreted as an extreme form
of uncertainty, as the procyclicality from marking to market becomes so strong that the
asset price and banks' investment can swing from self-fullling expectations without any
change in fundamentals.
A unique stable equilibrium can be guaranteed provided this procyclicality is not
too strong, i.e. if banks' asset demand does not rise too quickly with price. This will
ensure that the excess demand function, t(i;pt) + nt(i;pt)   N, is monotone decreasing
in price and hence cuts zero from above at most once. A precise sucient condition for
a unique stable equilibrium is that banks' demand function be a \contraction" of passive









Under this condition, uniqueness of a stable equilibrium can be established using argu-
ments akin to contraction mapping theorem.12 Intuitively, this condition requires that, as
asset price rises, banks' demand for asset climbs more slowly than passive demand falls.
In other words, banks' demand function is 
atter (and inverse demand function steeper)
than that of passive investors, as depicted on the left panel of Figure 7.
Leverage is an integral determinant of the strength of procyclicality, as the next
result establishes.
Proposition 1. The slope along any two points of banks' demand is decreasing in h.
Proof. The objective is to establish that, for any arbitrary p1 and p0, jnt(i;p1) nt(i;p0)j
































12Assume a continuous excess demand function t(i;pt)+nt(i;pt) N : [0;1] 7! [ 2N;2N] that cuts
zero at least once so that an equilibrium always exists. For no loss of generality, consider any arbitrary
pair of prices p0 < p1. Since banks' demand slopes upwards while the passive demand slopes downwards,
condition 3.7 implies that
nt(i;p1)   nt(i;p0) < t(i;p0)   t(i;p1)
t(i;p1) + nt(i;p1)   N < t(i;p0) + nt(i;p0)   N
That is, any part of the excess demand function is always downward-sloping in price. The method of
successive approximations can be employed to solve for a unique stable equilibrium, akin to how a unique
xed point is guaranteed in the contraction mapping theorem.
24which is decreasing in h for any p1 and p0.
An immediate implication is that, the uniqueness condition 3.7 is more likely to
fail with higher leverage. Intuitively, higher leverage raises the strength of balance sheet
valuation mechanism, enabling banks to expand debt-nanced asset purchase following
any price increase. Underlying this mechanism is an externality, as one bank's increased
asset demand pushes price up, allowing other banks to purchase more asset and so on.
This results in higher sensitivity of market equilibrium to fundamental shocks such as
changes in passive demand. It is in this sense that higher leverage is associated with more
procyclicality. As leverage grows suciently high, the spillover eect between banks
becomes so strong that coordination problem emerges: each bank will purchase more
asset if it believes other banks will also do so, but will sell otherwise.13
Procyclicality in this form presents a challenge to the policy maker. If adjustments
in monetary policy, either via policy interest rate or through macroprudential regulation,
are not large enough to raise h above the range that can support multiple equilibria,
monetary policy can be ineective. The market equilibrium in this case will solely be
a function of self-fullling expectations rather than h that the policy maker may be
adjusting to no avail.14 For monetary policy to have an eect, the policy adjustment
must be large enough to ensure that the contraction condition 3.7 holds. With strong
procyclicality, the transmission of monetary policy can be highly nonlinear.
The potential ineectiveness of policy interest rate alone provides a powerful ra-
tionale for adopting an alternative and more coercive measure such as regulatory policy.
Indeed this is one of the oft-cited reasons when some central banks adopt macroprudential
measures to control nancial excesses. But, perhaps less obviously, even with a unique
equilibrium, the balance sheet mechanism remains a potent source of complex procycli-
cality that can pose threat to nancial stability in a non-trivial way. To pursue this
issue at greater length, henceforth it will be assumed that the condition for equilibrium
uniqueness is always satised throughout and multiplicity never arises.
3.2.2 Path dependence and dynamic implications
Equation 3.5 shows that banks' demand function exhibits path dependence property, since
the current demand nt depends on pt 1 and nt 1 in addition to the current price pt. Past
equilibrium therefore has bearing on the current demand. As an illustration, consider
the following two limiting cases. As pt ! 1, the asset demand asymptotes to nt 1=h, so
13The association between strong strategic complementarities and multiple equilibria is well-
documented in the literature, see for example Cooper and John (1988).
14In a more elaborate model, e.g. one equipped with an equilibrium selection mechanism, it may
be argued that monetary policy works by changing the relative sizes of the basins of attractions, which
makes one equilibrium more likely than the other. The market equilibrium in that model, while unique,
will still be insensitive to monetary policy for small policy adjustments.
25a larger asset holding in the last period would boost the current demand. On the other
hand, the intercept of the inverse demand function (the price pt at which nt = 0) is given
by pt 1(1   h), so that a higher equilibrium price in the last period would raise inverse
demand function (i.e. a drop in demand). These limiting cases suggest that the past
equilibrium aects the current asset demand by `rotating' the demand schedule. We will
now characterize these rotational adjustments in demand curve more precisely using the
idea of contraction, and show how they give rise to non-trivial dynamic implications.
The key result of this section can be understood intuitively. Asset price and asset
holding jointly determine banks' initial balance sheet size, which in turn dictates the
strength of balance sheet mechanism and resulting degree of procyclicality. Stronger
procyclicality is associated with a 
atter of banks' demand schedule, indicating higher
demand elasticity with banks increasing their demand by more in response to a price rise.
While higher elasticity implies stronger propagation of any positive shock to asset price,
it also implies more vulnerability to any negative price shock. With this mechanism
at work, nancial instability can simply be induced by a positive transitory shock to
price. A positive shock leads to the expansion of banks' balance sheet, which raises
procyclicality and leaves the asset market highly vulnerable. A reversal in shock, due to
its transitory nature, is therefore sucient to result in an outsized downward adjustment
in asset price as banks scramble to sell asset in a falling market. The evolution of asset
market adjustments therefore closely mimics the build-up of bubbles and the subsequent
crash. This is our basic story of how nancial instability emerges.
We begin our formal discussion of the model's dynamics and implications by rst
establishing the existence of steady states and characterize their properties.
Steady states
A steady state is dened as a sequence of equilibrium outcomes in which the pair
fnt;ptg is xed over time, and equal to some constant fn;pg. In other words, in
a steady state equilibrium, both passive and banks' demand schedules must be time
invariant. But it is evident from equation 3.5 that, for a given history of past equilibrium
fnt 1;pt 1g, there is a unique pair on the banks' demand schedule that can be upheld
as a steady state equilibrium, namely fnt;ptg = fnt 1;pt 1g = fn;pg. This steady
state can then be attained under some passive demand schedule t(i;p) that leads to the
equilibrium pair fn;pg. This establishes the existence of a steady state. An alternative
way to characterize a steady state equilibrium, is to take passive demand function as
given. Any pair fnt;ptg on the passive demand schedule is consistent with a steady state
corresponding to the history fnt 1;pt 1g = fnt;ptg = fn;pg.
There are clearly an innite number of possible steady states. A formal welfare
evaluation between dierent steady states is beyond our scope, and instead focus will
be on short-run equilibrium dynamics after a steady state is perturbed by shocks. We





















Figure 8: The lasting impact of temporary shock
maker's problem is to stabilize the economy around this initial steady state.15
Shocks and instability
Figure 8 depicts the asset market equilibrium. All variables are predetermined in
period 1, and we are interested in the evolution of asset market equilibrium in periods 2
and 3. The initial equilibrium at point A, fn
1;p
1g, coincides with a steady state which,
in the absence of any further shock, would imply n
1 = n2 = n3 and p
1 = p2 = p3. The
corresponding banks' demand schedule is represented by the curve D-D. Assume that
in period 2 the passive demand schedule is subject to a positive temporary shock that
causes it to shift upwards, before falling back to its original position in period 3. That is
Passive demand in period t = t(i;pt) + ct (3.8)
where c1 = c3 = 0 and c2 > 0. How would this period-2 temporary shock aect the
dynamics of asset market equilibrium?
Given that the initial equilibrium at point A is a steady state, banks' demand
function remains unchanged in periods 1 and 2, before endogenously adjusting in period
3. In period 2, the upward shift in passive demand bids up the asset price, which in
turn leads to banks' capital gain and higher demand for asset that pushes asset price
up further. The equilibrium in period 2 is at point B, in which both asset price p
2 and
banks' asset holding n
2 are now higher than at the initial steady state A.
15In a fuller model, the welfare-maximizing steady state may be one in which the market correctly
prices risks associated with the asset's return. In this case, the risk-return prole of the asset as well
as the social welfare function must be spelled out. Alternatively, the society may wish to maximize the
asset price in equilibrium (thereby minimizing the real sector's borrowing cost) while maintaining the
banks' zero prot condition.
















The rst observation is that fn3;p3g = fn
2;p
2g is a solution to equation 3.9, hence
the period-3 demand schedule goes through period-2 equilibrium fn
2;p
2g at point B.
Secondly, we can establish the following:




1, then n2 is a contraction of n3, namely there exists k < 0


















































   




2 < 1 completes the proof.
By the same arguments used in the proof of Proposition 1, Proposition 2 implies
that the inverse demand function in period 3, depicted by E-E curve in Figure 8, cuts
the D-D curve from the left and only once at point B. Banks are now responding more
aggressively to asset price movements, raising demand more rapidly if price rises and
selling more heavily should price fall.
If the upward shift in passive demand was permanent, point B would have been a
new steady state. But as passive demand schedule shifts back to its original position in
period 3, there will be an excess supply of asset at the old equilibrium price p
2. The initial
downward pressure on price is then amplied by the balance sheet adjustment mechanism,
as banks sell assets in a falling market in an attempt to retain the old leverage ratio. Since
the selling is now more pronounced given a new demand function that is more sensitive
to price, the new equilibrium price will undershoot p
1. In Figure 8, the equilibrium is
restored only at point C, which illustrates an extreme case where banks exit the market
altogether.
The transition from point B to point C is the \Wiley Coyote" moment, as the
expansion of banks' balance sheet leaves the asset market highly vulnerable to any price
fall. Thus, a temporary positive shock will only induce a short-term price appreciation,
but will lead to an undershooting of asset price following the initial boom. As apparent





















Figure 9: Eect of a temporary fall in passive demand
On the other hand, the impact of a negative shock to passive demand, i.e. when
c2 < 0 is qualitatively dierent. This case is illustrated in Figure 9, where we make
the converse assumption that the passive demand shifts down temporarily in period 2.
The asset market equilibria in periods 1, 2 and 3 are represented by points A, B and C
respectively. There is still a net decrease in the asset price, so the temporary shock does
have a permanent eect, however there will be no overshooting. This property, too, is
generic.
Short-term aberrations in passive demand, albeit temporary, can therefore have a
permanent eect on the asset market equilibrium. The response of equilibrium asset price
and banks' demand to shocks is asymmetric: an upward shock will result in an amplied
upward movement, followed by a large crash that undershoots the initial steady state.
In the case of a negative temporary shock, there will be an amplied eect on price
initially, which is then attenuated in the subsequent period. Thus, in our model, the
absence of large and persistent shocks does not preclude asset prices from being volatile
and susceptible to periods of booms followed by busts.
Financial instability in our model emerges through a procyclicality mechanism that
simply relies on marking to market and balance sheet adjustment. The instability does
not stem from \irrational exuberance" or endogenous \leverage cycle" that have often
been cited as key features of nancial crises. Our analysis suggests that one needs not
see a pick-up in leverage in the run-up to a crisis, as instability can emerge even if banks
never change their targeted leverage throughout the adjustments. To be sure, the level of
leverage does indicate the nancial system's vulnerability to shock at any given point in
time, but in terms of monitoring the development of nancial instability over time, the
more appropriate indicators may simply be changes in the asset price and banks' balance
sheet size themselves.
Our analysis also has broader methodological implications. It proposes a novel way
29in which crises and nancial instability can be theoretically expounded. Our approach
distinguishes between the basic procyclicality mechanism, which propagates shocks in
the standard way, versus the second mechanism that makes the strength of procyclicality
itself procyclical. In the present model, the positive response to a price increase is the
basic procyclicality mechanism. The feedback eect of banks' balance sheet expansion
on asset demand makes the basic mechanism itself procyclical. The two mechanisms
combined ensure that a boom automatically sows its own seed of destruction, so that
unless it is supported by persistent shock, an eventual outsized crash is inevitable.16
3.3 Scope of Stabilization Policy
Uncertainty is a key constraint facing the policy maker in our model, as policy choices
must be committed before shocks are observed. If shocks occur very rapidly, the policy
makers may not be able to retract the policy they prescribe before they can observe
whether the shock has already receded or not. A clumsy policy maker is therefore not
necessarily inept in terms of skills, but simply operates under extreme uncertainty and
constrained by a policy tool that works with a long lag which cannot be re-calibrated
to respond to shocks in real time. The policy maker faces the same scenario considered
in the previous section, where passive demand curve is subject to a random temporary
shock in period 2 potentially posing threat to nancial stability. The policy objective is to
safeguard nancial stability by ex ante minimizing the variances of asset price as well as
banks' lending around the initial steady state over these last two periods.17 Conditional



















c with probability 0.5
 c with probability 0.5
(3.12)
where c > 0. Given this symmetric and discrete shock distribution, the policy objective




[L(c) + L( c)] (3.13)
16Theories of endogenous business cycles are relatively scarce, and there is still a lack of workhorse
model. For a recent much-needed contribution, see Suarez and Sussman (1999).
17Under this assumption, we abstract entirely from macroeconomic stabilization considered in details
previously, and let the policy maker focus exclusively on safeguarding nancial stability. Thus if there
were any limitations of policy interest rate, they would not be due to con
icts with macroeconomic
stabilization objective.
30The policy maker can employ both the conventional policy interest rate and reg-
ulatory policy that limits the extent to which banks can expand/contract their asset
investment. Policy interest rate aects the asset market equilibrium via both passive
and banks' demand functions. Two dierent variants of regulatory policy are considered:
(1) a capital-to-asset ratio requirement h or equivalently leverage constraint that banks
must meet, and (2) a cap and a 
oor on the number of assets held,  n and n

, that nt must
obey.
It is important to distinguish between two distinct policy dimensions. The rst
pertains the adequacy of using the policy interest rate as the sole instrument for counter-
cyclical discretionary monetary policy, and whether there are grounds for expanding the
standard counter-cyclical toolbox to include regulatory policy. The second issue concerns
the design of monetary policy framework that will enable the economy to better withstand
shocks, and how deployment of rule-based prudential regulatory measures may constitute
an important ingredient for achieving such desirable outcome. The objective of this
section is to elucidate the role of regulatory policy in each of these two contexts and shed
light on what a coherent implementation of prudential measures should entail.
3.3.1 Optimal discretionary policy
The use of interest rate tool is always discretionary in our analysis.18 The nimble policy
maker is free to choose any i2 and i3, while the clumsy policy maker can pick any i2 = i3.
On the other hand, by retaining discretionary power, the policy maker can also impose a
binding capital-to-asset ratio requirement onto banks by setting h2(i) and h3(i) or impose
requirement on n2 and n3. The policy is rst prescribed at the beginning of period 2 after
the rst-period equilibrium is determined but before the period-2 shock is drawn. The
nimble policy maker gets another chance to adjust the policy just before the nal period
commences.
Let us brie
y foreshadow the main results of this section. In solving the policy
optimization problem 3.13, the clumsy policy maker must anticipate and take into account
the direct impact of its policy not only on period-2 but also on period-3 equilibrium. The
policy is therefore optimized only once. Given the temporary nature of the period-2
shock, the inability to retract policy will dissuade the clumsy policy maker from over-
stabilizing period-2 equilibrium, as a big adjustment will itself introduce shock to the
market in the nal period.
The nimble policy maker, on the other hand, can readjust the policy in the nal
period, and hence has no reason to hold back in the second period. Results from section
3.2 show that smaller balance sheet adjustment in period 2 implies a milder impact on
18Since there is no expectations-augmented Phillips curve in the present model, there is no time
inconsistency problem and no gain from committing interest rate to a policy rule. Thus the policy maker
can retain discretion in the use of policy interest rate without incurring any welfare loss.
31the nal-period equilibrium. Solving backwards, this implies that the nimble policy will
simply aim to stabilize the period-2 equilibrium, provided it knows the direction of the
shock. Under uncertainty, it will react relatively more aggressively to a positive shock in
period 2 than it would if the shock was negative, as the impact from shock on period 3
is asymmetric.
Transmission mechanism of interest rate
An interest rate change aects the market equilibrium through both passive and
banks' demand. Suppose that the period-1 steady state is underpinned by an initial
interest rate of i1, and the interest rate is lifted by  > 0 to i1 + , with no binding
regulatory policy in place. The rst impact is to lower passive demand since @t(i;p)=@i <
0. Secondly, banks' demand is also decreased, represented by a leftward shift of demand




























 n2(i1 + ;p)
A policy rate tightening therefore reduces the asset demand from both passive
investors and banks. In the absence of any shock in period 2, the eect of such policy
change on market equilibrium will be to unambiguously lower asset price. Moreover, given
the upward-sloping shape of banks' demand, there will be an unambiguous decrease in
banks' asset holding in the new period-2 equilibrium. The reason is that the interest
rate rise has both a direct and indirect impact on banks' demand. Apart from lowering
period-2 leverage directly, the negative shock to asset price also triggers the balance sheet
mechanism that induces banks to scale down asset holding further. The net impact of
policy tightening is therefore to lower asset price and curb banks' lending in the second
period.
Faced with the prospect of temporary shock in period 2, what is the optimal interest
rate policy? It is instructive to rst consider the perfect information case, in which the
policy maker knows in advance the realization of c2. Suppose it is foreseen that c2 = c.
When choosing interest rate i, the policy maker knows that the market clearing condition
in period 2 is given by












If the policy maker wishes to stabilize the period-2 equilibrium, it can set i > i1 in order
32to absorb the observed positive shock c2 = c > 0. The policy maker can choose to
stabilize the asset price completely by setting i such that p2 = p
1, which requires the
interest rate to be the solution to
N = t(i;p






Under this interest rate, banks' asset holding is n
1h1(i1)=h1(i) < n
1, since i > i1 and
h0
1 > 0. Therefore to totally stabilize the asset price, the policy maker will need to raise
the policy rate by so much that it causes a contraction in banks' asset holding. The




















Since i > i1, it follows that p2 > p
1. The policy adjustment that completely stabilizes
banks' asset holding is not sucient to stabilize the asset price. There is in fact a
locus tracing all combinations between banks' asset holding and asset price attainable by
adjusting policy interest rate, lying strictly above and to the left of fn
1;p
1g. Given the
quadratic loss function, the policy maker would likely trade o some contraction in banks'
asset holding for bringing the asset price closer to target. The key point here is that it
is not possible to completely stabilize both asset price and banks' asset holding, since
the interest rate tool is too blunt to fully absorb a passive demand (i.e. sector-specic)
shock.
Claim 1. Policy interest rate cannot simultaneously stabilize both the asset price and
banks' asset holding in period 2, even with perfect information about shock. The interest
rate as a tool is too blunt, and control is necessarily imperfect.
This `imperfect control' problem is relevant for the nimble policy maker, but be-
comes even more severe for the clumsy policy maker. Given that policy cannot be removed
in period 3 and that the period-2 shock is only temporary, an all-out attempt to absorb the
period-2 shock is likely to be suboptimal since it will result in passive and banks' demand
over/undershoot in period 3. The optimal interest rate for the clumsy policy maker will
therefore have to negotiate a trade-o between (1) responding more to stabilize period-2
market equilibrium and lessen the impact of procyclicality on period-3 outcome, versus
(2) responding less to avoid disrupting period-3 equilibrium from policy over-adjustment.
In other words, the interest rate is also too blunt along the time dimension, and cannot
fully absorb short-term temporary shocks, so that only partial stabilization can be carried
out. The fully optimal policy response for a clumsy policy maker, under certainty about
33period-2 shock, will therefore be characterized by partial absorption of the initial shock
and partial stabilization of period-2 equilibrium.
Let us now describe the optimal policy under uncertainty. We rewrite the loss
function as L(c2;i2), allowing the loss function to depend explicitly on the policy choice
variable. The dependence on period-3 interest rate is suppressed, as in the case of the
nimble policy maker we take the optimal period-3 interest rate as given and interpret
 L(c2;i2) as the value function which is parameterized by i2. For the clumsy policy







In other words, the optimal policy under uncertainty should equalize the marginal loss
under the two shock realizations.
Suppose that the policy maker keeps interest rate constant at i1. It follows from the
optimal policy under certainty that, irrespective of the policy maker's type, L2(c;i1) < 0
since raising rate in the event of positive shock is counter-cyclical, whereas L2( c;i1) > 0
for opposite reasons. Meanwhile, results from Section 3.2.2 suggest that the eect of
shocks on market equilibrium in period 3 is asymmetric, with a positive shock having a
larger impact as it is propagated rather than absorbed by balance sheet mechanism. This
implies that, for the nimble policy maker, a small upward adjustment of interest rate in
period 2 increases the value function when there is a positive shock, by more than the
deduction in value when the shock is negative, namely
 L2(c;i1) > L2( c;i1)
To satisfy the rst-order condition 3.15, interest rate needs to be raise since L2(c;i1) < 0
and L22(c;i1) > 0 due to convexity. Thus it follows that i > i1 for the nimble policy
maker.
The clumsy policy maker faces a more binding constraint, since the policy choice
cannot be withdrawn in the nal period. In this case, any policy tightening is tantamount
to a negative shock to the asset market in period 3. The clumsy policy maker will
therefore be more averse to policy tightening under uncertainty relative to the nimble
policy maker. The optimality condition can be solved numerically, which readily shows
that under symmetric shocks as assumed in 3.12, the optimal policy choice is to always
lower interest rate.
Claim 2. Despite the shock symmetry, the optimal discretionary policy prescribes pre-
emptive interest rate adjustments. The nimble policy maker should raise interest rate,
while the clumsy type should lower it.
Our result oers one perspective on the `lean versus clean' debate. On the one hand,
34the `leaning against the wind' strategy, forwarded by the BIS amongst other proponents,
suggests that an interest rate can and should be raised to preemptively rein in nancial
excesses (see White (2009) for example). Our model provides the conditions under which
the `leaning' strategy may be optimal: (1) the policy maker must be condent that there
will be a positive shock, or (2) in the presence of a large degree of uncertainty, then the
policy maker must be able to retract its policy suciently quickly. On the other hand,
the `clean' strategy, favoured by many practitioners especially before the subprime crisis,
can be rationalized in our model if a large degree of uncertainty is coupled with more
volatile shocks that work their way through more quickly than monetary policy can hope
to oset in real time.
Transmission of regulatory policy
The discretionary use of regulatory tool is qualitatively very similar to the use of
interest rate. To see this, consider the case of perfect information about shock (c2 = c >
0), and suppose that capital-to-asset ratio requirement is the sole instrument. To absorb
the positive shock, the ratio requirement can be raised so that h2(i1) > h1(i1). This
policy will produce the same directional eect on banks' demand schedule as an increase
in interest rate, but will not aect passive demand. Therefore, the passive demand
function is eectively the constraint that the policy maker must take as given in both
periods 2 and 3 when choosing capital-to-asset requirement. It follows then that the use of
discretionary capital-to-asset requirement also suers from the imperfect control problem.
The extent of this problem relative to the use of interest rate policy is ambiguous for the
clumsy policy maker, since the loss of control in period 2 due to inability to aect passive
demand is compensated by the period-3 gain since capital-to-asset requirement policy is
not blunt along the time dimension.
Policy implications under uncertainty remain very much in the same spirit as in the
case of interest rate. The optimal discretionary capital-to-asset requirement h
2 should







The merits of leaning against the wind versus cleaning are qualitatively identical to
the line of arguments given above. Claims 1 and 2 therefore generalize to the use of
discretionary regulatory policy.
It is clear that an optimal combination of interest rate and capital-to-asset require-
ment will raise welfare, since the policy maker can always mimic the one-instrument
outcomes by choosing not to employ one of the tools. The exact optimal combination is
likely to be complex however. For example, equipped with both policy instruments, the
imperfect control problem disappears in period 2. Following a positive shock c2 = c, the
35policy maker can implement the initial equilibrium fn
1;p
1g exactly by (1) raising interest
rate to completely neutralize the eect of shock, i.e. set i2 such that t(i1;p
1) = t(i2;p
1)+c,
and (2) lowering capital-to-asset requirement to neutralize the eect of interest rate
increase on capital-to-asset ratio, i.e. set h2 = h1(i1) < h1(i2). In other words, capital-
to-asset requirement helps cushion the impact of higher rate on banks' demand, allowing
the policy interest rate to directly absorb passive shock more than otherwise.
Claim 3. In the optimal combination of policy, the two instruments may need to work
in opposite direction in order to ne-tune both banks' asset holding and the asset price.
The stringent context in which perfect control can be achieved should be highlighted.
The basic requirement is that the policy maker must be able to foresee shock with
suciently high accuracy that it is willing to prescribe two policies that work by canceling
each other out. Moreover, this complex policy mix is most likely suboptimal for the
clumsy policy maker, whose tools remain too blunt along the time dimension.
3.3.2 Framework design and rule-based prudential policy
The preceding discussion illustrates that the discretionary use of regulatory policy in
addition to interest rate, while welfare-enhancing for trivial reasons, is subject to a
number of limitations. In addition to the problem of imperfect control if the policy tools
remain blunt, the optimal combination of multiple instruments is likely to be complex
and therefore highly susceptible to errors or inaccuracies on the part of policy maker. The
idealized optimal monetary policy is in other words unlikely to be robust. In addition,
there are other important considerations that have not been incorporated into the model,
e.g. policy makers must ultimately aim to stabilize in
ation and growth, or that the
policy maker will nd communicating con
icting policy moves very problematic. Taking
these factors into account, the constraints facing the policy maker will become much more
binding. Even if the policy maker eventually deems it worthwhile to pursue discretionary
policy, the complexity of actions can compromise policy transparency, one of the key
benets of in
ation targeting framework.
Perhaps most importantly, treating regulatory policy as an additional instrument for
discretionary policy purposes may not give full justice to its potential role as a `prudential
measure'. Indeed, the underlying source of instability in our model is structural, as it lies
in the procyclicality within the banking sector originating from balance sheet mechanism.
Discretionary counter-cyclical policy only attempts to absorb shocks and smooth out their
impact, but cannot x the problem at its root. This section considers the problem of
designing a `framework' that helps alleviate procyclicality at the source, using rule-based
regulatory policy.
A rule-based regulatory policy is dened to be a regulatory policy that is structurally

























Figure 10: Rule-based regulatory policy as prudential measures
response to shock assessment. We consider two related types of such rule-based policy:
(1) a capital-to-asset requirement that the policy maker xes throughout all periods,
h1 = h2 = h3 = h (we hold interest rate xed henceforth, and suppress i to ease
notation), and (2) a cap and a 
oor on banks' asset holding,  n and n

, that n1, n2 and n3
must obey.
Figure 10 depicts the adjustments of market equilibrium in response to shocks, with
the left panel showing the eect of a capital-to-asset requirement whereas the right panel
displays the eect of a cap and a 
oor on asset holding. In either case, the initial steady
state equilibrium is given by point A. A random shock then perturbs the passive demand
in period 2, represented by the dotted lines in both panels. Absent any rule-based policy,
a positive shock will lead to a higher asset price and balance sheet expansion, marked by
point B1. Conversely, a negative shock will result in B2 being the new equilibrium. The
new equilibrium then provides a new basis on which the banks' demand will adjust in
period 3, as described before.
Consider the case where the policy maker, by tightening rule-based regulatory
policy, enforces a structurally higher h. Proposition 1 implies that imposing a higher
h requirement in this structural sense will rotate the banks' demand schedule anti-
clockwise around the initial steady state, as shown in the left panel. Intuitively, a
permanently higher capital-to-asset ratio weakens the balance sheet mechanism and hence
the underlying strength of procyclicality, making banks' demand less responsive to price
changes. The eect of such policy is to increase the resiliency to shocks of either direction.
A positive shock now results in smaller upward adjustments in both asset price and banks'
asset holding, represented by point C1. Similarly, a negative shock only induces an
equilibrium adjustment to point C2 relative to B2 without policy. These smaller period-2
adjustments, in turn, imply less pronounced adjustments in the nal period since the
37path dependence of banks' demand becomes less severe.
Alternatively the policy maker may set a cap  n and a 
oor n

on the banks' asset
holding as shown on the right panel. The result is to make banks' demand perfectly
inelastic to asset price at nt = n

and nt =  n. The new equilibrium under a positive and
a negative shock is given by points D1 and D2 respectively. Analogous to the capital-to-
asset requirement, these limits on banks' asset holdings serve to curb procyclicality at its
source, and as a consequence make the market more resilient to shocks.
Claim 4. The rule-based implementation of regulatory tools, via capital-to-asset require-
ment and balance sheet cap policies, can reduce the degree of procyclicality at the structural
level, and hence help stabilize the asset market even if shocks cannot be foreseen in
advance.
The stabilizing benet of rule-based regulatory policy holds even when there are
multiple equilibria. Enforcing a suciently high capital-to-asset ratio, by Proposition 1,
can help coordinate banks' expectations around a unique stable equilibrium. A prudent
design of monetary framework should therefore ensure that, at the minimum, the leverage
is never allowed to be too high to admit self-fullling prophesies to arise. On the other
hand, a tighter gap between asset holding 
oor nt = n

and cap nt =  n will help limit the
extent of equilibrium 
uctuations that may arise from multiplicity. Indeed the equilibrium
uniqueness is restored when the gap approaches zero in the limit.
It is in this sense that regulatory policy can be employed in pursuit of prudential
goals. The policy maker cannot foresee whether nancial instability will occur, any
more than it can forecast what type of shock will be realized. In the context of such
uncertainty, there is a limited room for discretionary policy to also play the prudential role
of guarding against instability. Instead, an appropriate design of policy framework that
fosters resiliency of nancial system against shocks can help contain the risk of instability
directly. In this regard, the regulatory policy can play an active role, while other
remaining discretionary tools can still be employed as usual. Prudential measures, as we
envisage, therefore supplement and strengthen the existing monetary policy framework,
and regulatory tools should be seen as complementary to the traditional interest rate tool
rather than a substitute for it.
4 Conclusions
The 2008-9 global nancial crisis has brought a sea of changes to the regulatory landscape.
Among them will be the implementation of various forms of macroprudential regulation
across jurisdictions. In this paper, we employ two separate models to explore a number
of issues surrounding the interactions between macroprudential regulation and monetary
policy, the traditional stabilization tool of central banks. While dierent in the setups,
38the two models share a common element in that banks balance sheet adjustments lead to
procyclical bank lending and thereby play a central role in amplifying economic shocks
in both models.
With the rst model, a standard small macroeconomic model for monetary policy
analysis, we nd that, purely from a macroeconomic dynamic perspective without any
nancial stability considerations, a countercyclical capital requirement is better than
a xed minimum capital requirement in terms of helping an optimizing central bank
stabilize the economy. This benet is despite the fact that a countercyclical requirement
is associated with higher in
ation variability and further reduces the strength of mon-
etary policy transmission. Other important ndings are that a countercyclical capital
requirement allows the central bank to respond less to output 
uctuations and that, on
top of nancial stability concern, actual countercyclical buer calibration may need also
to take into account the nature of shocks hitting the economy and the social preference
towards output and in
ation.
With the second model that takes seriously nancial stability modeling, particularly
the role of asset price and marking to market, we nd that procyclicality plays a more
complex role in the development of nancial stability than simply magnifying shocks.
Such complexity, combined with the uncertainty regarding the nature and timing of
shock that may disrupt the system, further justies the role of rule-based macroprudential
regulations as speed limits to tame procyclicality at source. The macroprudential policy
recommended should be thought as part and parcel of the monetary policy framework
to strengthen the nancial systems resilience at the structural level, rather than an
alternative competing countercyclical tool.
39References
Adrian, T., and Shin, H. S. (2010). \Financial intermediation and monetary economics."
Federal Reserve Bank of New York Sta Reports 398.
Angelini, P., Neri, S., and Panetta, F. (2010). \Grafting macroprudential policies in
a macroeconomic framework: choice of optimal instruments and interaction with
monetary policy." Banca d'Italia.
Angeloni, I., and Faia, E. (2009). \A tale of two policies: Prudential regulation and
monetary policy with fragile banks." Kiel Working Paper 1569.
Barro, R. J., and Lee, J.-W. (2010). \A new data set of educational attainment in the
world, 1950-2010." NBER Working Papers w15902.
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2010). \Group of governors and heads of
supervision announces higher global minimum capital standards." Press Release.
Bernanke, B. S., and Blinder, A. S. (1988). \Credit, money and aggregate demand."
American Economic Review, 78, 435{39.
Borio, C., and Zhu, H. (2008). \Capital regulation, risk-taking and monetary policy: a
missing link in the transmission mechanism?" BIS Working Papers No 268.
Cecchetti, S. G., and Li, L. (2005). \Do capital adequacy requirements matter for
monetary policy?" NBER Working Papers w11830.
Clarida, R., Gali, J., and Gertler, M. (1999). \The science of monetary policy: A new
keynesian perspective." Journal of Economic Literature, 37(4), 1661{1707.
Clement, P. (2010). \The term `macroprudential': Origins and evolution." BIS Quarterly
Review, 59{67.
Cooper, R., and John, A. (1988). \Coordinating coordination failures in keynesian
models." The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 103(3), pp. 441{463.
Covas, F., and Fugita, S. (2010). \Procyclicality of capital requirements in a general
equilibrium model of liquidity dependence." Working paper.
Ehrmann, M., and Smets, F. (2003). \Uncertain potential output: implications for
monetary policy." Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 27(9), 1611{1638.
Filardo, A. (2007). \Asset price bubbles and monetary policy: A multivariate extension."
BIS Working papers.
Geanakoplos, J. (2009). \The leverage cycle." Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No.
1715.
Gertler, M., and Kiyotaki, N. (2010). \Financial intermediation and credit policy in
business cycle analysis." Handbook of Monetary Economics (forthcoming).
Holmstrom, B., and Tirole, J. (1997). \Financial intermediation, loanable funds and the
real sector." The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112, 663{691.
40King, M. (1997). \Changes in uk monetary policy: Rules, discretion in practice." Journal
of Monetary Economics, 39, 81{97.
N'Diaye, P. (2009). \Countercyclical macro prudential policies in a supporting role to
monetary policy." IMF Working Paper WP/09/257.
Rudebusch, G. D., and Svensson, L. E. (1999). \Policy rules for in
ation targeting."
NBER Chapters, Monetary Policy Rules, 203{262.
Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. W. (2010). \Unstable banking." Journal of Financial
Economics, 97(3), 306 { 318.
Stone, M., Roger, S., Shimizu, S., Nordstrom, A., Kisinbay, T., and Restrepo, J.
(2009). \The role of the exchange rate in in
ation-targeting emerging economies." IMF
Occasional Papers No. 09/267.
Suarez, J., and Sussman, O. (1999). \A stylized model of nancially-driven business
cycles." CEMFI 9722.
Taylor, J. B. (1979). \Estimation and control of a macroeconomic model with rational
expectations." Econometrica, 47(5), 1267{1286.
Taylor, J. B. (1993). \Discretion versus policy rules in practice." Carnegie-Rochester
Conference Series on Public Policy, 39(1), 195{214.
Walsh, C. E. (2010). \Monetary theory and policy." The MIT Press.
White, W. (2009). \Should monetary policy `lean or clean'?" Federal Reserve Bank of
Dallas, Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute Working Paper 34.
Woodford, M. (2003). \Interest and prices: Foundations of a theory of monetary policy."
Princeton University Press.
41